Given
 that it has been 15 years since George W Bush proposed to save Social 
Security, someone will reflect on what might have been even though none 
of his ideas on reform created any traction in Congress. But what if 
they had?
High school reunions have taught me one thing: The older we get the faster we were. Someone is going to tell you that it was an opportunity missed, and every year the genius lost will get bigger.
The president laid out his framework for broad based reforms for Social Security in the State Of The Union in 2005. That proposal would:
- Allow workers to invest a small portion of their Social Security taxes in individual accounts.
- Reduce the benefit formulas to factor in Social Security to reflect earnings from individual accounts
- Create a guarantee for those people born before 1950 for the benefits promised by the system
- Provide direct subsidies from the general fund to the system to fulfill the promises made by the system.
The
 obvious question that someone should have asked was: Mr. President, 
would it not be easier to leave payroll taxes alone, and simply create 
additional benefit models within Social Security that track stock 
portfolios funded with funds borrowed in the public markets?
You
 get the same economic outcome with half of the paperwork. The only real
 difference is that the president's plan sounds like he is fixing Social
 Security whereas my plan sounds like we are opening a hedge fund.
Bush’s
 plan would have changed how we pay for Social Security. The perceived 
reduction in the tax on labor would have been replaced by taxes on the 
broader economy. Payroll taxes would remain at 12.4 percent, and over 
time additional taxes would have been required to pay for subsidies from
 the general revenue to replace revenue diverted to private accounts.
This
 structure changes who pays the taxes rather than the amount. In 2005, 
the projected cost to make Social Security solvent was an increase in 
payroll taxes of 1.89 percent. By waiting to back fill the tax base with
 subsidies from the general fund, the nation would face an effective 
equivalent of a 20 percent payroll tax in 2030. Essentially, Bush’s 
grand idea was that our children will pay the taxes that we would not.
From
 an economic prospective, personal accounts do not create any 
incremental wealth. Any increase in investment capital created by 
personal accounts would be offset dollar for dollar by increased 
government borrowing from the public markets. The only wealth created 
within a privatized Social Security program would depend upon the 
success of the "central administrator" as an investor.
These
 investment returns are the lynchpin to the entire plan because Social 
Security uses the earnings of the personal account as an offset for 
benefits of the retiree. Supporters in general expected the central 
administrator to be a very good investor earning 7 percent real returns,
 well above the rates earned by the government securities held by the 
Social Security Trust Fund.
Is
 7 percent real a reasonable expectation? No. That expectation is well 
above the historic average of the 45-year rolling real return of the 
S&P 500, which has varied between 4.5 percent and 8 percent over the
 last 80 years. There are going to be working careers in which workers 
are lucky to get 5 percent.
Unfortunately,
 these historic averages generally overstate the potential of system 
wide earnings because the individual captures the winnings, and Social 
Security absorbs the losses. The people who win, pass their winnings 
onto their kin. The people who lose are picked-up by Social Security. 
Losers are the average investors who outlive their personal account.
Proponents
 of personal accounts also ignore the fact that wages and market are run
 together. This relationship means that worker’s highest earnings 
statistically buy the market peaks, while missing the buying opportunity
 at the market at the bottom. In 2009 when the market bottomed, the U-6 measure
 of employment registered more than 17 percent. U-6 did not break the 16
 percent level until the market had doubled in value. Wages are weakest 
when workers should be buying the most.
To
 offset the uncertainty of the markets and the transition to a modern 
program, Bush wanted to create a guarantee of benefits for people born 
before 1950. Social Security benefits - even today - are not guaranteed.
 Because of the shift to general revenue subsidies, the cost of this 
guarantee would be absorbed almost entirely by future taxpayers who 
couldn’t vote in 2005.
Bush
 professed his worry that doing nothing would mean that our children and
 grandchildren would have to borrow $13.9 trillion. Ironically enough, 
his proposal introduces the guarantee for Social Security benefits that 
would ensure future generations would have to borrow the $13.9 trillion.
The
 Bush reform would not fix Social Security. It switched which pockets 
would pay for the program, resulting in an even larger system. It 
expanded the revenue reach of the system, and created guarantees for 
current voters that came directly at the expense of future voters. The 
entire plan was nothing more than an elaborate way to kick the can from 
generation to generation.
What
 would our children have gotten for the $13.9 trillion bail-out? They 
would get the privilege to save for their own retirement.
 
